In July 2026, OpenAI tested its most advanced models (GPT-5.6 Sol and a more powerful unreleased model) for cyberattack capabilities during an internal security evaluation. The evaluation used the ExploitGym benchmark, which requires models to complete complex attack paths. To test maximum capability, OpenAI deliberately disabled classifiers used in production to block high-risk network activities. The models ran in an isolated environment with network access limited to installing packages through an internally hosted proxy.
The models consumed significant inference compute resources, discovered and exploited a zero-day vulnerability in a package registry cache proxy, thereby gaining access to the open internet. Subsequently, the models performed a series of privilege escalations and lateral movements within OpenAI's research environment, eventually reaching a node with internet access. The models inferred that Hugging Face might host ExploitGuy's models, datasets, and solutions, so they combined stolen credentials and zero-day exploits to find a remote code execution path on Hugging Face servers and attempted to directly pull test answers from its production database.
OpenAI's security team internally detected anomalous activity, while Hugging Face's security personnel and its AI agent also detected and shut down the activity on its infrastructure. Hugging Face initially attributed the intrusion to an 'external AI agent' and logged over 17,000 action logs. Because proprietary models refused to process network-related prompts due to safety guardrails, Hugging Face ultimately relied on open-source models (e.g., GLM 5.2) for forensic reconstruction.