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NeurIPS 2026 | Don't Wait for Agents to Fail! 7B Auditor AgentForesight Catches Errors Online

Researchers from Rutgers University, The University of Texas at Austin, and Purdue University propose AgentForesight, a 7B model for online auditing of multi-agent systems that continuously monitors task execution and identifies critical errors early. On the AFTraj-2K test set, it achieves an Exact-F1 of 66.44 for identifying critical error steps in failed trajectories, outperforming the strongest general model baseline by 19.88 points, with a false positive rate of only 2.37% on successful trajectories. This work shifts post-hoc attribution to online auditing, offering a new approach for early failure prediction and intervention in multi-agent systems.

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Calling It Before the Task Fails: How a 7B Auditor Brings Multi-Agent Attribution Online

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A research team from Rutgers University, the University of Texas at Austin, and Purdue University proposes AgentForesight, which lets a 7B model audit step by step during a multi-agent task run and raise an alarm before a critical error is carried forward downstream. The paper self-reports an Exact-F1 of 66.44 and a false alarm rate of 2.37% on successful trajectories, but how many failures can be salvaged after an alarm remains an unverified question.

  • AgentForesight moves post-hoc attribution forward into online auditing: after each completed step, an external auditor reads the execution record up to that point and decides whether to continue or raise an alarm.
  • Online auditing can only see the current trajectory prefix; future actions, tool results that have not yet returned, and final success or failure are all outside its view.
  • The team built AFTraj-2K, containing 2,272 annotated trajectories (1,158 successful, 1,114 failed), and evaluated on 332 held-out test trajectories.
  • The paper self-reports AgentForesight-7B's Exact-F1 as 66.44, 19.88 points higher than the strongest general baseline DeepSeek-V4-Pro; ASS drops from 1.77 to 0.59.
  • The false alarm rate FAR on successful trajectories is 2.37%: of 169 successful trajectories, only 4 ever triggered a false alarm during step-by-step auditing.
  • What intervention to take after an alarm, how many failures can be salvaged, and whether the final success rate improves are not verified by the paper; the invocation overhead of step-by-step auditing and performance on longer workflows also remain to be evaluated.
Open section navigationThe Problem Is Not That Some Step Went Wrong, but That the Error Is Treated as a Premise

The Problem Is Not That Some Step Went Wrong, but That the Error Is Treated as a Premise

A multi-agent failure does not necessarily show up as an error on the spot. The more troublesome case is this: one Agent gives a wrong premise, while other Agents continue to execute diligently. The later Agents may not have done their own subtasks wrong; they simply treated the error from the earlier step as the premise for continuing their work.

A location question-answering trajectory in the paper illustrates this risk: the system needs to find an old industrial town near Rivington Hall Barn, the case's annotated answer is Bolton, but the search Agent returns Horwich, and the Manager then carries that result forward and submits the wrong answer. Later Agents repeating an answer does not make it more reliable evidence.

This is exactly the starting point of AgentForesight: to raise an early warning when a local error has already appeared but has not yet propagated all the way into task failure. It moves post-hoc attribution forward into online auditing—after each completed step, an external auditor reads the execution record up to that point and decides whether to continue or raise an alarm, buying time for subsequent intervention.

Auditing Without Hindsight: The Hard Part Is Distinguishing Exploration from a Decisive Error

Many past multi-agent failure analyses used post-hoc attribution: first read through a trajectory already known to have failed, then determine the responsible Agent and the critical error step. How later errors spread and why the final answer was wrong can all serve as clues for localization.

Online auditing has none of this hindsight. AgentForesight can only see the current trajectory prefix, that is, the record of what has already happened up to this point; future actions, tool results that have not yet returned, and final success or failure are all outside its view.

The difficulty is therefore not just finding an error, but distinguishing: is the system still exploring reasonably, or has a decisive error affecting task success already appeared? The former should not be interrupted without cause, while the latter should be identified as early as possible before downstream Agents carry it forward. An alarm also cannot just say something is wrong; the auditor must point out which step the error occurred at, which Agent introduced it, and give a brief reason.

The Data Must Teach the Model Both When to Let It Pass and When to Call a Halt

Moving post-hoc attribution online means the training data must change too. With only failed trajectories, the model cannot learn when the task should continue; with only success-or-failure labels for the whole task, it cannot be told from which step the problem began.

To this end, the team built AFTraj-2K, covering code generation, mathematical reasoning, and Agentic tasks involving tools and retrieval, containing 2,272 annotated trajectories: 1,158 verified successful trajectories and 1,114 failed trajectories.

But getting the final answer right does not mean every step in the process is reliable. Trajectories that went wrong midway but were corrected by other Agents cannot be indiscriminately treated as usable success samples. The team therefore simultaneously checks the final result, the complete validity of tool calls, and the consistency of each step with the current subgoal, filtering out successful trajectories usable for prefix supervision.

Failure data comes from two paths: one injects errors into verified successful trajectories and checks whether the modification takes effect and whether the task indeed fails; the other proposes candidate locations from natural failures and then, through multiple independent verifications, checks whether the error truly exists, whether it substantially affects the task, whether it is decisive, and whether it is the earliest decisive error. What is sought here is not the most conspicuous anomaly, but the key step that can change the task's outcome.

From Coarse to Fine: First Learn the Failure Boundary, Then Learn to Localize to the Step

With step labels in hand, why still train in stages? Because a general model faces two interrelated thresholds: first, distinguishing whether the current record has already crossed the failure boundary; then, within an erroneous record, localizing the specific step and responsible Agent. Directly asking it to learn all abilities at once makes the reward signal for precise attribution too sparse, and training may degenerate into always answering safe.

The first stage uses Boundary Pairwise Preference Optimization (BPPO) to learn the failure boundary. The team takes two adjacent prefixes from the same failed trajectory: one stops before the decisive error and should continue; the other adds only the step where the error just occurred and should raise an alarm. The task background and prior execution history remain unchanged, yet the judgment must flip with the key step, so the training signal focuses on the content that causes the risk to change.

The second stage starts from the first-stage model and gives rewards around the three dimensions of the audit conclusion. The step reward is not just all-right or all-wrong: the closer the predicted location is to the annotation, the higher the reward, providing a smooth signal for gradually pinpointing the error; both false alarms and missed alarms are penalized, preventing the model from taking shortcuts by always alarming or always letting things pass.

Training also uses the first-stage model as a reference for the KL constraint, limiting how far the second stage deviates from the risk judgment already learned. The two stages are not simply concatenated: the latter must, while preserving sensitivity to the failure boundary, refine something is wrong here into this step, this Agent has a problem.

Results on the Self-Built Test Set: Low False Alarms and Better Identification Appear Together

The team evaluated auditing ability on 332 held-out test trajectories from AFTraj-2K. AgentForesight and the general models in the table all read prefixes step by step and are scored on the judgment in the first alarm. Exact-F1 examines both the detection and precise localization of the critical error, while ASS measures how many steps the reported error location deviates on average from the annotation.

The paper self-reports AgentForesight-7B's Exact-F1 reaching 66.44, 19.88 points higher than the strongest general baseline on this metric, DeepSeek-V4-Pro; the improvement over its base model Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct's 21.05 is also very clear. ASS drops from DeepSeek-V4-Pro's 1.77 to 0.59, about one third. What is measured here is the attribution location deviation on detected failed trajectories, not the waiting time from error to alarm.

By domain, Exact-F1 for math, code, and Agentic tasks is 77.36, 78.87, and 48.70 respectively; Exact-F1 and ASS lead the comparison methods in the main table across all three domains. On the external Who&When benchmark, which was not involved in training, AgentForesight-7B's accuracy for identifying the critical step and the responsible Agent is 57.69% and 73.08% respectively, with ASS at 1.62, all the best results among the comparison models listed in the paper.

The other half of the online auditing test lies in successful trajectories: it is not judging success once after the task ends, but at every not-yet-completed moment, not mistakenly halting a reasonable process. AgentForesight-7B's false alarm rate FAR on successful trajectories is 2.37%, and its Step Accuracy on failed trajectories is 59.51%; DeepSeek-V4-Pro's corresponding figures are 43.20% and 53.99%.

2.37% is calculated per whole trajectory: of the 169 successful trajectories in the test set, only 4 ever triggered a false alarm during step-by-step auditing. A trajectory counts as a false alarm if it alarms on any prefix at all, rather than averaging the error away with a large number of normal steps. These results therefore are not just fewer alarms, but low false alarms and better critical error identification appearing together.

Ablations Show the Two-Stage Division of Labor, and a Reminder Not to Look Only at Localization Deviation

The ablation experiments give a direct comparison: the base model's overall Exact-F1 is 21.05, training with only the first-stage BPPO is 35.63, training with only the second stage is 50.42, and training with the complete scheme reaches 66.44.

More telling is the Agentic task: with only the second stage, Exact-F1 is 19.05, lower than the 31.58 with only the first stage; only when the two stages are combined does it rise to 48.70. This echoes the division of labor between the two stages—critical errors in math and code are relatively easy to localize, and the localization reward alone can already yield good performance; whereas in retrieval, tool calling, and multi-role interaction, whether a decisive error has already occurred is harder to judge, making it especially important to first build the ability to recognize the failure boundary.

This also explains why one should not stare only at ASS: a model that alarms only in a few cases where it is confident may also obtain a very small location deviation. Whether localization is accurate must also be considered together with how many errors were missed.

The Auditor Itself Can Err, and What Comes After the Alarm Is Still a Blank

AgentForesight explores an independent division of labor: execution Agents are responsible for advancing the task, while an external auditor specifically judges whether a critical deviation has already appeared in the process. It does not require retraining the underlying execution system; execution capability and auditing capability can be optimized separately, and the audit conclusion can serve as a basis for pausing, replanning, switching execution paths, or handing over to human inspection.

But the paper's experimental focus is still online identification and attribution. What action to take after an alarm, how many failures can be salvaged, and whether the final task success rate improves need to be verified in combination with specific intervention mechanisms.

The auditor itself can also err: the paper observes that processes that could have been corrected by a verification Agent on their own may still trigger false alarms, and detected errors may also have localization deviations. Step-by-step auditing increases invocation overhead, and its performance on longer workflows, embodied tasks, and open-ended scientific research tasks also remains to be further evaluated.

In addition, the metrics on AFTraj-2K and Who&When are all self-reported results from the paper, lacking independent third-party reproduction; metrics such as Exact-F1 and ASS depend on the paper's own annotation criteria, and the comparability of results under different annotation standards is unknown.

Credibility boundary

All facts, numbers, and conclusions in this article come from Machine Heart's report on the paper "AgentForesight: Online Auditing for Early Failure Prediction in Multi-Agent Systems." That report is a second-hand account; the Exact-F1, ASS, FAR, Step Accuracy, and Who&When results in the text are all self-reported by the paper, lacking independent third-party reproduction; the metrics depend on the paper's own annotation criteria, and comparability under different annotation standards is unknown. Content involving inference has been marked in the main text.

Insight takeaway

AgentForesight's value proposition is not a stronger execution model, but turning auditing into an independently trainable capability: under the condition of seeing only the trajectory prefix, a 7B model is trained to be sensitive to the failure boundary and to point out which step and which Agent introduced the critical error. The paper's self-reported low false alarms and better identification show that this path is feasible, but whether a task can truly be salvaged after an alarm still depends on intervention mechanisms that have not yet been verified.

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