Almeida states plainly that he is not against safety itself, but argues that specific value judgments should not be written directly into the base capabilities of a general-purpose model; instead, the boundary between technical capability and specific usage responsibility should be drawn like a database. He distinguishes capability alignment from safety alignment: capability alignment means making the system complete the user's task as much as possible, whereas safety alignment often means the model, beyond following the current user's instructions, must also prioritize another set of rules set by the model provider—and these two sets of requirements sometimes conflict.
He compares a model called by a program suddenly refusing to answer to a type error. If the model is a software dependency running in the background, and some call suddenly refuses, the user calling it may have no idea there is even such a model underneath; should the entire software pipeline randomly break just because a special message appears in the input? He argues this design inherits the imagination of "AI as a chat colleague" and fails to fully consider what requirements a model must meet as a software component.
To the counterexample of "what if someone uses this API to kill people," he responds that he too does not want technology used to harm people, but that enterprises can take a stance for practical reasons, and he does not think these preferences should be written directly into the base capabilities of general-purpose technology. He prefers to think of intelligence as a database rather than an "AI colleague": we normally do not require a database to judge on its own, when executing a query, whether the user will ultimately use the results for something bad.
He also mentions a scenario he finds strange: a developer told their team on Slack that they were preparing to deploy an application, and asked, "Can we use Jev this way?" His first reaction was that we provide an API, you are the developer, and how the specific application is designed should not require our approval on every point. Ideally, complex tasks would be broken into many smaller calls, and as an underlying service provider, we should not even need to know the full task of the downstream user.